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When performance awards depend non-linearly on performance outcomes, agents have an
incentive to manipulate the timing of their performance. Under bonus-based contracts,
for example, agents may time their performance so that they just meet the numerical
standard to receive their bonus. Under this timing strategy, agents postpone excess
performance above the standard from good to bad years thereby increasing their chances
to receive bonuses in bad years. Although these timing responses to non-linear contracts
have received some attention in the organization literature, there is no direct evidence
that this behavior creates a welfare loss. (See Gibbons (1997) and Prendergast (1999)
for a survey.) The main goal of this paper is to examine whether this behavior re￿ects a
misallocation of real resources or simply an accounting phenomenon.
The distinction between timing responses based on an eﬃciency criterion plays a key
role in this paper. Timing strategies that create no welfare loss while increasing the
agents￿ chances of earning bonuses are accounting manipulations. Accounting responses
do not create any welfare loss because the organization can neutralize this behavior by
appropriately discounting the performance award. Alternatively, timing strategies may
lead agents to ￿invest in the wrong tasks￿ or to ￿game￿ the performance incentive system
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991 and Baker, 1992).1 Timing strategies are evidence of
gaming if they do not only imply some kind of accounting manipulation, but also a costly
misallocation of resources.
We investigate this distinction between accounting and gaming responses in a large
federal job training program for the disadvantaged, created by the Job Training Partner-
ship Act (JTPA) of 1982. JTPA is one of the ￿rst large-scale implementations of ￿nancial
performance incentives in a federal bureaucracy. The JTPA incentive system rewards
training agencies on the basis of their trainees￿ labor market achievements on the date
they graduate from training. The incentive system leaves training agencies some discre-
tion over the timing of the graduation date. The central focus of this paper is to study
1We take in this work a wide interpretation of the multi-tasking framework and consider the timing
strategy as one of the agent￿s tasks even though it has no value to the principal.
1how training centers use this discretion.
Some of the timing strategies presented here have already been identi￿ed in our previ-
ous work (Courty and Marschke, 1997). This paper builds on that work in three important
ways. First, this paper oﬀers an analytical description of the training center￿s optimal
graduation strategy that generates a much wider set of implications than were considered
previously. Second, we present formal tests of the model￿s implications. Third and most
importantly, this paper investigate some of the welfare implications of timing strategies.
The paper develops as follows. The following section reviews the organization litera-
ture on gaming responses to explicit incentives. Section 3 describes the JTPA organiza-
tion, its performance incentive system, and our data. Section 4 shows that the program
administrators maximize their performance awards by timing optimally the graduation
date of program participants. Section 5 studies the eﬃciency of these timing strategies
and Section 6 summarizes our ￿ndings.
2 Incentive Theory and Gaming Evidence
Bonus-based compensation schemes award bonuses when performance outcomes exceed
preset numerical standards. Such schemes are common in some occupations: CEOs, sales
people, and piece workers receive bonuses when ￿rm earnings, yearly sales, and piece
rates exceed predetermined targets, quotas or thresholds (Murphy, 1998). An important
regularity that is emerging from the empirical literature on incentives shows that nonlinear
incentive contracts often encourage agents to manipulate the timing of their performance.
In an early contribution to this literature, Healy (1985) documents that managers
who are compensated for meeting annual income thresholds use their discretion over the
timing of income reporting to smooth their compensation across accounting years. More
recent works report similar timing responses to threshold eﬀects in other settings. For
example, Asch (1990) showed that navy recruiters who receive awards for meeting year-
end recruitment quotas respond by reallocating their work eﬀorts over the year. Similarly,
Oyer (1998) showed that there is more variability in ￿rms￿ sales at the end of the ￿scal
2years￿when sales persons￿ bonuses are computed￿than in the middle. The empirical
evidence on threshold-motivated timing responses to incentives is surveyed in Gibbons
and Prendergast.2
Four components common to many incentive systems create these timing responses.
First, the incentive award is a non-linear function of the agent￿s performance. Second, the
performance outcomes are aggregated over ￿xed periods and the agent is rewarded at the
end of each period on the basis of her cumulated performance. Third, the performance
outcomes vary for random reasons that are outside the agent￿s control. Finally, the agent
is able to choose the period in which performance is reported. Although the argument
applies generally to non-linear awards, the rationale behind these timing responses is best
illustrate under a bonus-based award.
Consider a simple environment where random ￿uctuations imply that the agent would
succeed in winning a bonus in good years but fail in bad years if she reported performance
outcomes without delay. Now, consider the following strategy that takes advantage of the
agent￿s discretion over performance reporting. In bad years, the agent delays performance
below the standard until the next bonus year, while in good years the agent delays positive
performance above the standard. In very bad years, it may be optimal to ￿take a bath￿,
that is, to report bad performances and carry over good performances until the next bonus
year. Under this timing strategy, the agent is more likely to receive a bonus in bad years
without compromising the chances of winning bonuses in good years.
In exposing this timing behavior, the literature shows the variety and creativity of
agent responses to incentives but oﬀers no direct evidence that such behavior creates a
welfare loss. In fact, the literature does not make an explicit distinction between account-
ing and gaming responses as de￿ned in the Introduction. Based on this distinction, a
review of the timing literature suggests that agents manipulate performance accounting
2There is also a literature studying timing responses by tax-payers to minimize their tax bill (e.g.
Dickert-Conlin and Chandra,1999, and Goolsbee 2000). Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier
and Ellison (1997) show that fund managers modify their investment strategies over the year to maximize
investment ￿ows into their funds. These studies demonstrate timing responses to incentive schemes. Non-
timing responses have also been documented. For example, Drago and Garvey (1997) oﬀer evidence that
individual-based performance incentives discourage coworkers from helping one another.
3but is inconclusive regarding whether this manipulation is gaming. For example, the man-
agers in Healy￿s study may not have to consume resources in ￿guring out at the end of the
accounting year how to optimally report their ￿nancial performance outcomes. Similarly,
the military recruiters in Asch￿s study as well as the salespeople in Oyer￿s study may vary
their eﬀort supply over the contract year as a result of the incentives they face, but this by
itself is not evidence of ineﬃciency. This work is the ￿rst attempt to estimate empirically
the costs of timing activities in performance incentives.
Discovering whether timing strategies are ineﬃcient has important economic impli-
cations. Evidence of welfare losses would contribute to a general argument, found in
the organization literature, attributing the scarcity of explicit incentives to the diﬃculty
of measuring performance outcomes. (See Jensen and Meckling (1992) for a review.)
According to this argument, principals can specify explicit performance measures only
approximately, which results in agents gaming the system by optimizing with respect
to the actual measures instead of the intended unmeasurable objective (Holmstrom and
Milgrom and Baker). Despite the popularity among organization theorists of the gaming
argument as an explanation for the scarcity of explicit incentives, there is little formal
evidence in its support. In fact, the gaming argument relies exclusively on anecdotes
accumulated over the years by organizational behaviorists (e.g. Kerr (1975) and Lawler
(1982)). Although these anecdotes suggest that explicit incentives do not always work
as intended, they do not demonstrate that these unintended responses are evidence of
ineﬃciency.
The set of threshold-driven timing responses sketched above seem to be a good candi-
date to conduct a formal test for costs of the unintended responses. We propose to conduct
this test in the JTPA organization for two reasons. First, the program administrators in
JTPA face a similar incentive environment as those studied in previous empirical work.
Meeting a ￿xed numerical performance standard plays a key role in the JTPA award
functions. Actually, several award functions in our sample are identical to a bonus-based
formula. Second, a recent evaluation of JTPA has generated a wealth of data on its
functioning, including separate accounts, by program administrators and by participants,
4of the training outcomes. Our ability to observe agent behavior that is normally hidden
from the organization, at least in the short-run, makes this study especially compelling.
In addition, these data are suﬃciently rich to generate measures of agent productivity.
In contrast with previous timing studies, these measures will allow us to conduct the
eﬃciency study that is required to test the gaming hypothesis.
Our strategy will be to identify some timing responses and to sign their welfare im-
pacts. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to conduct a full-scale welfare analysis.
T h i ss t u d y ,h o w e v e r ,p r e s e n t s￿ndings that should be taken into account in a more com-
plete evaluation of the overall eﬃciency of the JTPA incentive system.
3 JTPA: Organization, Incentive System and Data
This section starts with a few summary facts about job training under JTPA, then de-
scribes the JTPA incentive system emphasizing those features that are most relevant for
this study and ￿nally introduces the three data sources that will be used in this paper.
The Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 created what is presently the largest federal
employment and training program serving the disadvantaged. Its current annual bud-
get is approximately $4 billion and it serves nearly one million people annually.3 The
JTPA bureaucracy is unusual for three reasons. First, JTPA is highly decentralized: job
training is carried out by more than 620 semi-autonomous sub-state training agencies.
Second, the Act gives these training agencies signi￿cant discretion over who is admitted
to the program and how training is conducted. Third, and most important for this study,
instead of a rigid, comprehensive set of rules to regulate bureaucratic conduct, the fed-
eral government uses a loose set of ￿nancially-backed performance incentives to in￿uence
outcomes.
3For a detailed description of JTPA, see Johnston (1987). For detailed descriptions of its incentive
system see Barnow (1992), Courty and Marschke (2000), and Dickinson et al.,( 1988). For empirical
analyses of the eﬀects of incentives on the population selected to receive training see Heckman, Smith
and Taber (1996), Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond (1993), Cragg (1997) and on the service provided
see Marschke (2000).
53.1 The Incentive System
In this section, we describe the main features of the incentive system which will be the
focus of our empirical work. Congress intended the performance incentives to measure
the training agency￿s success in developing participants￿ human capital (Job Training
Partnership Act, Sec. 106(a)).4 The Act gave the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)
the responsibility to develop a workable set of performance measures based on the Act￿s
mandate. The DOL chose a set of short-term labor-market measures based on an enrollee￿s
employment status, wage, earnings, and/or number of weeks worked at the end of job
training. Table A.1 in the appendix de￿nes the federal measures.
Along with selecting labor market measures, the DOL also decided that the labor
market outcomes would be measured on the date participants graduate from the program.5
The graduation date is the date the training agency oﬃcially closes an enrollee￿s case
and removes her from its rolls. To receive additional training after the graduation date,
the enrollee must be re-enrolled. Note that the same date corresponds to two concepts:
graduation, that is, termination of the enrollment period, and reporting of the labor market
outcome.6 Training agencies discretion over the graduation date is limited by the following
rule: the JTPA regulations require training agencies to graduate a participant￿at which
time her labor market outcomes are recorded￿within 90 days of her last day of training.
The individual states administer the incentive system. The JTPA ￿scal year lasts from
July 1 to June 30 of the next calendar year. At the end of each ￿scal year, or program
year, the state rewards (or sanctions) their training agencies on the basis of their year-end
performance outcomes. In aggregating performance over a ￿xed period of 12 months, the
JTPA incentive system is thus similar to many incentive systems. The award augments
the training agency￿s budget in the following year. Averaging over all JTPA training
4It should be noted that human capital development is not the exclusive goal of JTPA. The Act, the
Act￿s amendments, and the U.S. Department of Labor in its role as interpreter of the Act mention other
goals such as equity and special service to individuals in the bottom of the income distribution. See
Heckman and Smith (1995) for a discussion of these goals and how they are expressed through the JTPA
performance incentives.
5In the time period for our study, 1987-89, the date of performance measurement corresponds to the
graduation date.
6We thank Canice Prendergast for suggesting this terminology.
6agencies, the award is the source of approximately seven percent of the operating budget.
3.2 The Data
This study relies on three data sources. The ￿rst two data sources are an administrative
data source and a participant data source which were collected for the DOL-commissioned
National JTPA Study (NJS). The NJS was an experimental study of the eﬀectiveness of
JTPA conducted between 1987 and 1989. The study was conducted using a classical exper-
iment methodology according to which JTPA applicants were randomized into treatment
and control groups. Members of the treatment group received training and members of
the control group were denied JTPA training services for 18 months. Sixteen of the orga-
nization￿s roughly 620 job training agencies participated in the NJS.7 The administrative
data include enrollee-level information on training activities, enrollment and graduation
dates, and the employment-at-graduation performance outcome. The participant data
were produced from a questionnaire administered to participants at the time of their ap-
plication and again 18 months later. As a result, this second data source includes detailed
information on individuals￿ participation in job training, schooling, and job search and
on employment during the 18 month period following random assignment.
The third data source describes the JTPA incentive policies. We obtained these poli-
cies from the states￿ governors oﬃces.8 We brie￿y summarize the main characteristics of
the incentive policies that will be used in the paper. Although each state uses similar
sets of performance measures, the policies show that the award formulas diﬀer somewhat
across states. To illustrate a stylized incentive contract, let Sk be the training agency￿s
performance outcome on measure k,a n dﬂ Sk be the numerical standard for the same mea-
sure. The simplest type of policy would give an award ψk for each measure k only if the






k > ﬂ S
k}, (1)
7S e eD o o l i t t l ea n dT r a e g e r( 1990) for a description of the implementation of the NJS. See Orr et al.
(1994) for a detailed description of the results of the NJS.
8We collected these data while research associates for the Center for Social Policy Evaluation, at the
University of Chicago. A summary description of this data can be found in Courty and Marschke, 2000.
7where 1{•} equals one if the condition in brackets is true. Because the Act leaves the
design of the incentive policies to the individual states, there is much variation in the
precise functional form of the awards. In some states, training agencies receive additional
awards for exceeding standards, with the performance-award relationship displaying many
sorts of non-linearities, such as piece-wise linear forms and nested qualifying conditions.
What matters for this study is that the Act requires only that awards be contingent
on achieving standards. As a consequence, the major portion of the potential award
across all training agencies in our study is paid out for simply meeting the standard. For
our analysis, we will assume that each training agency faces functional form (1) because
it is the simplest formulation allowing us to test for incentive responses common to all
incentive policies.
4 Timing Activities in JTPA
In this section, we study how training agencies time the graduation date. We start by
investigating the optimal graduation strategy before the end of the program year assuming
that the award depends only on the employment performance measure. We then generalize
this simple graduation strategy. The ￿rst two subsections develop and test econometric
models based on the argument sketched out in Courty and Marschke (1997).9 The ￿nal
subsection extends the argument of Courty and Marschke to examine the eﬀects of features
of the incentive system that they did not consider.
4.1 Graduation Timing Before the Program Year-End
Because labor market outcomes vary over time naturally on their own, training agencies
have an incentive to manipulate the reporting date for the employment outcomes. At the
end of an enrollee￿s training, training agencies face a decision: to graduate the enrollee and
report her labor market outcomes, or to postpone graduation in hopes that the outcome
improves. The optimal graduation strategy leads the training agency to graduate enrollees
9We borrowed Figures 1, 2 and 3 from Courty and Marschke to concisely convey the main intuition
of their argument.
8who are employed within the 90 day period following training either on the last day of
training or on the ￿rst day of employment, whichever occurs ￿rst, and all others on the
90th day following training end.
We introduce some notation to expedite the discussion. Let gi and fi be enrollee i￿s
graduation date and training end date, respectively. Figure 1 presents the distribution of
gi − fi, the number of days that pass between the end of training and graduation. This
distribution is plotted separately for persons who report being employed and unemployed
on the last day of training. First note the wide dispersion of gi − fi.T h ef a c tt h a tm a n y
enrollees are reporting that their training ends after the graduation date (negative values
of gi − fi), we believe, indicate considerable error in the measurement of the training
end date.10 Even so, among enrollees who are employed on the last day of training
(represented by the dashed line in Figure 1), the modal enrollee is graduated at the ￿rst
possible opportunity, that is, at the end of training. For the modal enrollee in that group,
gi = fi. Among enrollees who report no employment at training end (represented by
the solid line in Figure 1), enrollees are not systematically graduated on the last day of
training. The presence of a pronounced spike in graduations for employed at training end,
and not for persons who are unemployed is consistent with the optimal graduation rule.
Figure 2 shows the same distribution by whether the enrollee is graduated employed.
The solid line in Figure 2 shows that the modal person who is unemployed at graduation is
graduated at the last possible moment, about ninety days after training ends. The dotted
line in Figure 2 shows the absence of a pronounced spike in graduations at the end of the
ninety day window for enrollees who graduate employed. Instead, among those enrollees
who graduate employed, graduations are highest in the days immediately following the
training end, tapering oﬀ through the end of the ninety day window, a pattern consistent
10We believe that there is considerable measurement error in the enrollee-reported training end date
for two reasons. First, because for many enrollees a year or more has passed between the last day of
JTPA training and the NJS follow-up survey, enrollees imprecisely recall the training end date. Second,
the survey inquires about all past training spells. While the survey seeks information about each past
spell individually, it does not ask the enrollee to indicate whether the spell occurred in a JTPA program.
Because JTPA spells are not identi￿ed, some spells that we treat as JTPA spells are not JTPA training
spells. Where an enrollee reports multiple training spells we consider the spell with the end date closest
to the graduation date for the comparison.
9with the fact that many enrollees who were initially unemployed found a job within 90
days of the end of training.
We now test for the optimal graduation strategy more formally. Let ei be the earliest
date following fi that individual i is employed, and ui be a dummy indicating whether
enrollee i failed to ￿nd a job within ninety days after fi. Using this notation, the optimal
graduation strategy states that training agencies graduate (1) enrollees who are employed
within the ninety day period on their ￿rst employment after training ends (that is, gi = ei
if ui = 0) and (2) enrollees who were never employed within the 90 days period on the
90th day following the end of training (that is, gi = fi +9 0i fui =1 ) .T h u s ,w eh a v e
gi =( 1− ui)ei + ui(fi +9 0 ) . (2)
To test this identity, we assume that participants report their training end date and
employment date with the same error, and that the training agency reports the graduation
date with a random error that is stochastically independent of the participant￿s error. The
observed variables are ui,￿ gi = gi + ηgi, ￿ fi = fi + ηi,a n d￿ ei = ei + ηi,w i t hηgi and ηi
assumed to be stochastically independent. Taking the graduation date as a reference
point, (2) can be rewritten in terms of the observed variables,
￿ gi − ￿ fi =( 1− ui)(￿ ei − ￿ fi)+ui90 + νi, (3)
where νi = ηi − ηgi. To test the identity (3) we add coeﬃcients and estimate
￿ gi − ￿ fi = β1(1 − ui)(￿ ei − ￿ fi)+β2ui + νi. (4)
Because the residual is stochastically independent of the independent variables, we es-
timate (4) using least squares. Under the assumption that the error term is normally
distributed, we can test whether the coeﬃcients corresponding to (1−ui)(￿ ei − ￿ fi)a n dui,
that is, β1 and β2, equal 1 and 90, respectively.
Model I, Panel A, of Table 1 presents a simple comparison of the mean delay for
enrollees who are employed sometime between training end and the end of the ninety day
10period (enrollees for whom u = 0) and enrollees who never become employed (u =1 ) . 11
(Model I is a regression of graduation delay on the variables (1 − u)a n du, without an
intercept.) Model I shows that participants who are never employed during the ninety
days following training end graduated 67 days later than those participants who obtain
employment sometime during the ninety day period. Panel C of Table 1 shows the p value
of the test of signi￿cance of this diﬀerence to be almost zero.
Model II in Table 1, reports the estimates of equation (4). The estimated coeﬃcient
on (1 − ui)(￿ ei − ￿ fi), at .99, to be close and statistically identical to one (the p value of
the test of identity to one is .888). The coeﬃcient on ui equals 101.8a n di ss i g n i ￿cant.
Thus, on average, training agencies wait 102 days to graduate those enrollees who remain
unemployed after completing their training. The coeﬃcient on ui is signi￿cantly diﬀerent
from 90, however. The observation that training agencies wait a little longer than 90 days
to graduate some unemployed enrollees suggests that the 90 days constraint is not always
perfectly enforced.
4.2 Graduation Timing Toward Program Year-End
We generalize the simple graduation strategy presented above to take into account the
training agency￿s discretion over the program year in which it graduates participants.
Consider a stylized two program year incentive system where the training agency receives
a ￿xed payment if the yearly labor market-based performance outcome exceeds a ￿xed
performance standard. The training agency does not know its ￿nal aggregate performance
outcome until the end of the program year because the labor market outcomes depend
upon random factors, such as the state of the local economy, which are outside its control.
Because of the graduation strategy described above, the training agency reaches the end
11 The NJS data ￿les contain 6444 adults with valid training agency-supplied enrollment and graduation
dates who graduated in program years 1987 through 1989. Nevertheless, many of these participants failed
to report in the NJS￿s participant survey having experienced a job training spell. Moreover, many who
reported training spells supplied invalid beginning and ending dates. For some of these spells, however, we
were able to impute dates. The subsample used in our graduation delay study described here contains,
after imputing some training spell dates, 2327 persons. An appendix describing in more detail the
construction of this subsample, including the imputation procedure, is available upon request.
11of the year with an inventory of enrollees who have ￿nished training within the previous 90
days but are unemployed. At the end of the ￿rst program year, the training agency chooses
how many from this inventory to graduate in the present program year, the remainder to
be graduated in the following program year. Assume there are n such persons, of whom
n1 w i l lb eg r a d u a t e di nt h e￿rst program year and n2 = n − n1 in the next one. The
training agency chooses n1 to maximize the present value of the sum of the two awards.
The optimal graduation strategy on the last day of the ￿rst program year depends
on the diﬀerence between the performance outcome and the standard as the last day
arrives. Let N = Ne + Nu be the number of persons who were graduated during the
year (excluding the year￿s last day), where Ne and Nu are the numbers of such persons
graduated employed and unemployed, respectively. Let ﬂ S be the performance standard.
Three cases can be distinguished (see Figure 3). In case one, on the last day of the year
the cumulative performance outcome exceeds the standard by so much that the training
agency can graduate all unemployed enrollees. In case one, because
Ne
N+n ≥ ﬂ S, n1 = n.I n
case two, the cumulative performance outcome exceeds the standard, but not by much.
In case two, because graduating all unemployed enrollees would push the outcome below
the standard, it pays the training agency to graduate persons from its inventory only
until the standard is bound. That is, the training agency chooses n1 such that
Ne






Equation (5) implies that n1 lies between 0 and n, approaching zero when the training
agency just meets the standard and n when the training agency outperforms the standard
by n/N or more. In case three, the training agency fails to meet the standard at the end
of the year, (
Ne
N < ﬂ S). In this case, because it cannot win an award this year, the
training agency ￿takes a bath￿, graduating all n persons from its inventory to maximize
the probability of an award next year.
Because the risks of not meeting a standard are substantial, the return on the strategy
described above is likely to be high. For example, according to Department of Labor data
on the entire JTPA system, in 1988, 13.9 percent of training agencies did not achieve the
12standards for the employment rate at graduation. If the above strategy plays an important
role, training agencies should graduate a disproportionate fraction of the enrollees in June.
Figure 4 shows the aggregate monthly graduation counts for the set of sixteen experi-
mental sites after correcting for the uneven sampling introduced by the NJS. Notice that
a large fraction of the year￿s graduations occurs in the month of June.12 In examining
training agencies individually, we found a program year end pile-up in at least one pro-
gram year in fourteen of the sixteen sites. The program year end pile-up is not explained
by the enrollment patterns of the JTPA enrollees, i.e. as Figure 3 shows, the graduation
pattern does not appear to be a rightward translation of the enrollment series. Although
many JTPA enrollees enroll in classroom-training services oﬀered through community col-
leges whose school years ended in May or June, this academic cycle does not explain the
program year end pile-up. Figure 5 shows the presence of pile-ups even for those enrollees
who do not participate in classroom training.
The two-period model outlined above suggests the following modi￿cation of (4).
￿ gi − ￿ fi = β1(1 − ui)(￿ ei − ￿ fi)+β3ui(1 − ji)+β5uijiLOWi
+β6uijiMEDi + β7uijiHIGHi + νi, (6)
where ji is a dummy, equal to one if June 30th falls within the 90 day period following
training and zero otherwise, and LOWi, MEDi and HIGHi are three dummies, respec-
tively equal to one if the performance outcome at the end of the program year lies in
the low, medium and high regions de￿ned by the horizontal axis in Figure 3, and zero
otherwise.
For persons who are not employed at training end, the model predicts the following:
12Training agencies enroll persons into their programs continuously, and year-round. Our data only
contain the enrollees who were also part of the NJS. For most training agencies in the NJS, random
assignments began in 1987, continued through 1988, and ceased in 1989. Thus, only in 1988 were the
majority of the program￿s enrollments at these sites contained in the experimental group. In program year
1987, typically only persons who enrolled in the latter part of the year were experimental participants.
In program year 1989, typically only persons enrolled in the ￿rst part of the year were experimental
participants. Because the NJS truncates 1987 and 1989, the June pile-ups produced by the raw data
in these years are likely to be biased estimates of the true pile-ups. Figure 4 shows graduation counts
in which persons enrolled in program years 1986, 1987, and 1989 are re-weighted so that the weighted
enrollment patterns in those years are identical to the enrollment pattern in 1988.
131. Unemployed enrollees whose training ends in the last three months of the program
year are less likely to be delayed 90 days. As a consequence, we should ￿nd that
the length of delay is longer on average for persons who ￿nish training between July
and March than for persons who ￿nish between April and June. We test whether
the length of delay diﬀers in this way by constraining β5 = β6 = β7 = β,e s t i m a t i n g
(6), and testing whether β3 > β.
2. Among unemployed persons whose training ends within 90 days of June 30th, en-
rollees in LOWi and HIGHi categories should be delayed for a shorter period on
average than individuals in MEDi. In terms of (6), this corresponds to testing
whether β6 > β5 and β6 > β7. In addition, individuals in LOWi and HIGHi should
be delayed approximately the same length of time, that is, β5 should be equal to β7.
Models III and IV in Table 1 test these predictions and provide evidence consistent
with the two-period model of the graduation decision. Model III reruns Model II, splitting
enrollees who are not employed throughout the grace period (enrollees for whom u =1 )
into two groups: one group contains enrollees whose 90 day grace period includes June
30, j = 1, and the other group contains enrollees whose 90 day grace period does not
include June 30, j = 0. As predicted, we ￿nd the estimate of graduation delay is greater
for the average person who ￿nished training between July and March, compared to the
average person who ￿nished between April and June; the point estimates of graduation
delay past the end of training is 113 days for the former group, and 79 days for the latter
group. This diﬀerence is statistically diﬀerent (the p value of the test of equality is .02).
In addition, the R2 rises slightly, from .150 to .153.
To test the remaining implications of the theoretical model, we created a subsample
based on the graduation decisions for the subsample of training agencies in our data
for which we had reliable estimates of year-end performance.13 The model predicts that
13Although training agencies provided us with the complete incentives in place during the years 1987
through 1989, they were generally unable or unwilling to provide reliable estimates of their year end
performance. Creating reliable estimates of year-end performance from our data is challenging. Because
of the design of the NJS, a training agency￿s experimental population generally represented only a portion
of the year￿s participants. To develop reliable estimates of year-end performance, we omitted training
14training agencies will delay graduating the average person whose training ends in MED
for a longer period of time than the average person whose training ends in either HIGH
or LOW. The estimates of Model IV are consistent with this prediction. That is, the
estimated coeﬃcient for the variable ujME Dis greater than the estimated coeﬃcients
for the variables ujH I G Hand ujL O W.T h e s ed i ﬀerences are statistically signi￿cant
(the p values for two-tail tests of equality are .030 and .024, respectively). Model IV shows
that training agencies apparently exploit the ninety day grace period fully: the coeﬃcient
estimates for (1−u)( e−f)a n du (1−j) are very close and statistically identical to one
and ninety, respectively.
To summarize, Table 1 shows that a training agency (1) delays graduating idle, unem-
ployed enrollees longer than idle, employed ones, (2) graduates idle, unemployed enrollees
sooner if they ￿nish at the end of the year than if they ￿nish at the beginning, and (3)
among idle, unemployed enrollees who ￿nish training in the last three months of the year,
graduates them sooner if the training agency is doing either very well or poorly relative to
the employment standard. These ￿ndings are consistent with the two period graduation
model.
Another way to display the optimal graduation strategy in the two-period model is by
plotting the movement of the employment outcome versus the standard over the course of
the program year. The model predicts that under the simplest incentive policy that pays
lump sum awards for meeting standards (as in equation (1)), the year end employment
outcome of training agencies in the MED or HIGH states must dip sharply downwards
toward the standard. For more general incentive policies, the model predicts that the
employment outcome should dip toward some level above the standard until the marginal
values of unemployed participants is equalized across adjacent years.14 Thus, the model
agencies from the estimation for which we did not have a substantial portion of the total year￿s par-
ticipants. The estimates of Model IV are based on graduation decisions in training agencies for which
70 percent or more of participants graduated during the program year were represented among the NJS
participants. For this reason, Model IV is estimated on a subsample of the data used to estimate Models
II and III. We also ran Model IV on samples created using training agencies for which we had 60, 50, 40
and 30 percent of the year￿s population of graduates. We found that these samples generally produced
statistically insigni￿cant relationships, presumably because we were admitting sets of observations with
ever more noisy measures of year-end excess performance.
14By a more general incentive policy we mean one that pays some award for outcomes in excess of the
15implies that the average performance outcome for training agencies in MED and HIGH
states will drop sharply at the year￿s end toward the standard but not necessarily touch
it. Figure 6 is consistent with this prediction.15 Figure 6 shows a sharp downward
movement in the employment outcome toward the standard, consistent with the practice
of holding unemployed enrollees in an inventory, drawing down the inventory only when
achievement of the standard is assured, and then only until either the overall outcome
attains the standard, or the inventory is exhausted. Such a graduation strategy maximizes
non-linear intertemporal awards.
Because the optimal strategy implies that individuals graduated in June do not per-
form as well as the individuals graduated in any other month, we present Table 2, which
examines ￿ve of the core federal performance measures for June and non-June gradu-
ates for all program years.16 June graduates show signi￿cantly lower outcomes on all
performance measures for all years. Another way to illustrate the prediction that June
graduates should perform worse than non-June graduates is to reproduce Figure 4 sepa-
rately by whether the enrollee is employed at graduation. Figure 7 shows that only the
non-employed produce the June phenomenon.
Let us consider the impact of the graduation strategy on the performance outcome
and the performance award. One measure of the private gains from delaying graduating
unemployed enrollees is the diﬀerence between the fraction of enrollees who are employed
on the day they ￿nish their training and the fraction employed on the day the training
agency oﬃcially reports them. We ￿nd that the overall employment rate at graduation
increases by 11.3 percentage points between these dates, from 47.0 percent to 58.3 percent.
Stated another way, training agencies in this study would produce an employment rate
outcome 20 percent lower if they were required to graduate enrollees (and report their
performance outcomes) on the date they actually ￿nish training.
standard.
15This ￿gure tracks the employment outcome and standard during the program year 1988 for the subset
of NJS training agencies whose estimated year-end performance outcomes placed them in either the MED
or HIGH states at the end of program year 1988.
16We have also conducted this comparison for each of the program years 1987, 1988 and 1989, separately.
The performance outcomes in each of these years show the same qualitative diﬀerences as in Table 2 .
16Finally, one could imagine that training centers might also delay graduating some
enrollees who are employed at training end. For example, towards year-end, when training
centers are in the HIGH or LOW states, they might delay graduating employed enrollees
who had ￿nished their training. While they may sometimes do this, this strategy is
likely to be second-order. Delaying graduating employed enrollees would be second-order
because until the year-end outcome is assured, a policy of postponing the graduation of
employed enrollees risks losing the employment, both because enrollees experience high-
turnover, and because caseworkers cannot easily verify the employment status of enrollees
who are not actively training.17
4.3 Additional Performance Incentives
We now generalize the graduation strategy presented in Section 4.1 to take into account
performance measures based on wages and earnings, the other signi￿cant class of JTPA
performance measures.18 These other measures may in￿uence the graduation decision
although their impact is likely to be small for two reasons. First, the employment-based
performance measure plays a disproportionate role in the determination of the award.
Second, there is little within-person wage variation during the 90 day period following
training end.
Nonetheless, taking into account the wage measures, training agencies may choose
to graduate employed enrollees who have little chance of experiencing a wage increase,
but wait on those employed enrollees who have a high likelihood of experiencing a wage
increase. The training agency does not wait on all enrollees because by doing so it might
lose credit for an employment. This risk is signi￿cant because approximately one quarter
of the enrolled who were employed on their graduation date were not employed at the
17An implication of such a strategy is another pile-up of graduations in the ￿rst month of a new program
year. Figure 4 shows no graduation pile-up in the ￿rst and second month of the program year.
18Some states in our sample reward training agencies for employments three months after thegraduation
date. That is, they receive awards if among their graduates the rate of employment on the 90th day after
graduation exceeds a numerical threshold. Like the graduation-date based measures, these follow-up
measures may in￿uence the graduation decision. Nevertheless, because it is more diﬃcult for the training
agency to in￿uence whether a person is employed three months after training ends, follow-up measures
should have a smaller in￿uence on the graduation decision.
17same job three months later. The re￿ned strategy which takes the wage measure into
account implies that some employed enrollees should be graduated later than is predicted
under the simple strategy presented previously. This re￿ned strategy is more diﬃcult to
identify statistically because the econometrician does not observe many of the variables
that are observed by the training agency that determine the likelihood that a particular
individual will experience a higher wage in a short horizon. To simplify the analysis, we
focus on the enrollees who were employed at the end of training and experienced a second
employment spell under a new employer before the close of the 90 day window.19
Taking into account the wage performance measure, the optimal graduation strategy
implies that those individuals who experience a wage increase on their second employment
spell after training ends are more likely to be graduated during that second employment
spell while those who experience a wage decrease are more likely to be graduated during
the ￿rst employment spell. Table 3 presents a contingency table for these two subsets
where the two contingent variables are whether the enrollee￿s graduation was postponed
beyond the start of the secondary employment spell and whether the enrollee experiences
a wage increase. A secondary employment spell is a spell which began after the month
training ends, but before the end of the 90 day grace period.
The upper panel of Table 3 shows that training agencies are more likely to postpone
graduating the enrollees who experience a wage increase within the 90 days following
training end (respectively 50% and 64% of the enrollees who experience a lower and higher
wage are delayed). While persons who experience wage increases show a greater incidence
of graduation delay, we cannot reject the alternative hypothesis of no association between
the two variables (The P-value from a chi-square test of the hypothesis of no association
is .147).
19For the analysis reported here, we created a subsample from the sample of 2511 used in the analysis
of Section 4.1 and 4.2, by selecting persons who (1) graduated in an incentive regime containing the
average wage at graduation measure, (2) had at least one employment spell ongoing at training end and
at least one other employment spell beginning before the end of the 90 day grace period, and (3) had
valid wage measures for each reported employment spell. The subsample created using these criteria
contained only 133 persons. Comparatively few observations are generating the results observed here,
because only 8 percent of our sample experience a second employment spell within the 90 day period.
An appendix describing in detail the construction of this subsample is available upon request.
18The optimal graduation strategy also predicts that those participants who are grad-
uated after the start of their secondary employment spell should experience higher wage
oﬀers. The lower panel of Table 3 tests for a relationship between the size of the wage gain
and the likelihood of graduation delay. The lower panel shows that the mean diﬀerence
between the wage in the secondary employment spell and the employment at training end
was higher for enrollees delayed than not delayed. The Wilcoxon rank sum test of the
equality in distributions compares the rankings of the diﬀerences by delay category to a
ranking generated by chance. This diﬀerence is signi￿cant at the .002 level. Thus the
covariation of graduation delay and the wages in secondary employment spells appears
consistent with a graduation strategy that maximizes the wage and earnings performance
outcomes.
5 Analysis of Gaming
The above results illustrate that some training agencies time the graduation date to
increase their performance outcomes and to maximize their intertemporal award streams.
This section presents a simple two-task model to estimate the eﬃciency impact of these
timing activities. To motivate this model and the estimation procedure, we start with
some informal evidence that the timing activities may indeed be costly.
Timing activities may lower the organizational objective by consuming substantial re-
sources. This is true both for graduation timing and for year-end timing. Consider ￿rst
the optimal timing of the graduation date to improve the employment performance out-
comes. Optimal graduation requires an up-to-date assessment of the employment state of
program participants. Because of the transient nature of many employment spells and the
shortness of the ninety-day window, case workers must aggressively monitor the enrollees￿
employment status. Such an intensive monitoring may divert resources (principally the
caseworkers￿ time) from other productive activities, thus diminishing training￿s human
capital impacts. In a phone survey of training agencies conducted by the authors, train-
ing managers oﬀered details of such costs.20 Training administrators related that they
20We conducted a telephone survey of the staﬀ of thirteen training agencies; eleven of these training
19￿nd it diﬃcult and costly to keep track of participants during the course of the training
period and after the training period is over. Case workers closely monitor participants by
phone, and when that is unsuccessful, they pursue them by mail, through their relatives,
a n de v e nb yp h y s i c a l l ys t a k i n go u tt h e i rl a s tk n o w nr e s i d e n c e s .
From a welfare standpoint, training agencies clearly waste resources if these eﬀorts are
merely to obtain credit for employment that participants ￿nd on their own. On the other
hand, training agencies also oﬀer ￿quick ￿x￿ services such as job referrals and placement
to those individuals who were not employed after the end of training. Actually, these last-
minute performance-driven services may be an eﬃcient way to increase human capital.
In the end, the issue of whether timing activities are evidence of gaming is an empirical
one that can be resolved only by estimating their human capital impact.
The same argument also applies to the year-end timing activities that take place in
June. In June, the burdens of graduation timing may multiply because the agency must
calculate how diﬀerent graduation strategies aﬀect its current year performance relative
to each of the standards it faces, as well as forecast how diﬀerent graduation strategies
in￿uence its award prospects in the subsequent year. In developing a winning strategy,
for example, a training agency may have to audit its inventory of enrollees, and to assess
the short and long-term employment prospects of the idle portion of the case load.
To test for gaming, we will adopt the multi-tasking framework and assume that case-
workers can allocate their time between two types of activities (or tasks): human capital
activities and timing activities. Under the gaming hypothesis, timing activities consume
caseworkers￿ time and attention but do not increase human capital. Because these two
activities compete with one another, we conjecture that average earnings among enrollees
i na n yg i v e np e r i o da r el o w e rw h e nt h ec a s e w o r k e r ss p e n dm o r et i m eo nt i m i n ga c t i v i t i e s .
We ask the question: Do those enrollees whose training takes place when training agencies
are more involved in timing activities receive less eﬀective training?
agencies were from the group of sixteen training agencies that appeared in the NJS. We spoke to super-
visors, managers, and training agency directors. We circulated a written questionnaire to these agencies
then received their answers over the phone. The objective of the survey was to develop background
information on how case workers assign enrollees to training activities, monitor enrollees while they were
in training, and decide when to graduate enrollees.
20Our empirical strategy will be to estimate whether human capital impacts are inversely
related to timing activities. Following the job training evaluation literature, we will
measure job training￿s human capital impact by its impact on the enrollee￿s earnings. In
the next two subsections, we test whether earnings gains from job training depend on
year-end timing and graduation timing.
Eﬃciency Impact of Year-End Timing. Because year-end timing only occurs in the month
of June, it is more likely to lower the human capital impact of those enrollees whose
training spells overlap with June. We test whether year-end timing is ineﬃcient by asking
whether training that takes place in June is less eﬀective than in other months. For each
enrollee, we construct JUNE, a variable equal to the fraction of her training spell spent in
the month of June (e.g., for a person who started training on April 1, 1987 and ￿nished on
June 30, 1987, JUNE is one third). JUNE measures the extent to which enrollees may
have suﬀered from year-end timing. Assume that earnings after training are generated
by,
Y = β1X + β2JUNE+ † (7)
where Y is the enrollee￿s earnings over the 18 months following random assignment and
X is a vector of control variables (including enrollee and labor market characteristics,
training agency and training type dummies, and training duration). We estimate this
equation using least squares and all adult data in all training agencies.21 Under the
gaming hypothesis, we conjecture that those enrollees trained in June have lower earning
impacts, that is β2 < 0.
The results of the estimation of (7) are reported in Table 4, Model I. We ￿nd that the
year-end timing eﬀect is both negative (−3959.56) and signi￿cant (the p value from the
test of the estimate￿s signi￿cance is 0.023). The implication of this is illustrated by the
example of an enrollee whose training lasts ￿ve months (roughly the average length of a
training spell) and ends on June 15. The coeﬃcient estimate implies that if the enrollee
were to begin her training 15 days earlier, thus ending her training not in the middle of
21We use only the enrollees who report receiving training over the enrollment spell to estimate (7). See
footnote 11.
21June but on May 31, her 18 month earnings gain would be $396 greater. To put this in
perspective note that the point estimate from the National JTPA Study of the 18 month
earnings impact ranges from $543 to $898.22 That is, by beginning her training earlier so
that it ended before June, this enrollee would likely enjoy a 44 to 73 percent increase in
her 18 month earnings gain from training.
T h en e g a t i v eJ u n ee ﬀect shows that those enrollees who are trained in June do not
gain as much from JTPA training. This is consistent with our hypothesis that year-
end timing diverts resources from human capital activities. This interpretation of the
coeﬃcient on the JUNE variable, however, is subject to some caveats. To start, this
￿nding may represent, partly or wholly, a seasonal eﬀect. In June, JTPA enrollees may
be competing with low-skilled high school and college students on summer recess. We
have tested whether the eﬀect we are attributing to June timing is instead a summer
eﬀect. We computed for each enrollee the measures JULY and AUGUST, respectively
the fractions of the training spell that occurred in the months of July and August. We
added JULY and AUGUST to our regression. The coeﬃcient estimates for JULY and
AUGUST were statistically insigni￿cant at conventional signi￿cance thresholds, and our
estimate for the JUNE coeﬃcient remained essentially unchanged.23
Of greater concern is that the June eﬀect may represent the burden of ￿scal year-end
duties, duties that do not add any new costs speci￿c to the use of incentives. A case closing
may require additional time to execute a review, ￿le paperwork, or to complete record
keeping. If costs of closing a case are incurred at the point in time the case is closed, then
a disproportional fraction of these costs will be counted in June. To separately identify
the incentive from the ￿scal year-end eﬀect, we considered exploiting the fact that June
earnings gains would likely depend on how the agency performs at the end of the year
under the gaming hypothesis but not under the ￿scal year-end hypothesis. The argument
22These numbers are based on the ￿gures in Exhibit S.1 of Bloom, et al. (1993). The 18 month earnings
gain is the diﬀerence in mean earnings in the 18 months following the date of random assignment between
persons in the control and treatment groups. See Bloom, et al. for details.
23The coeﬃcient estimates (t statistics) for the variables JULY and AUGUST were -930.09 (-.49)
and 2941.34 (1.45), respectively. We could not reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients were jointly
insigni￿cant (p value was .348).
22is that under the gaming hypothesis, the agency would choose how much to invest in June
gaming activities by solving an inter-temporal award maximization problem that depends
on its June performance and on the its June inventory of enrollees. Unfortunately, we
have very poor information on the latter variable and little can be said in general about
how June earning impacts should depend on the former variable alone.
Graduation Timing. Next, we test the impact of graduation timing on earning impacts.
The central idea is that earnings impacts should be greater when fewer enrollees compete
for the caseworker￿s attention. We again exploit the multi-tasking idea that time spent on
graduation timing activities is time taken from human capital activities. We presume that
the burden of this kind of timing increases with the number of enrollees whose graduation
is being delayed. Under the gaming hypothesis we should ￿nd that, holding constant
the rate at which new enrollees are assigned to a case worker, the greater the number of
enrollees whose graduation is delaying, the smaller the earnings gain enjoyed by that case
worker￿s average enrollee.
The data from the experiment are not suﬃciently complete to compute accurate mea-
sures of the number of enrollees who are idle or in active training for each training day.24
Instead, we construct a variable that proxies for the intensity of timing activities at the
training agency level. The variable DELAY is computed for each training agency and
measures how much the agency invests in graduation timing activities relative to training
activities. To compute this variable, we measure for each enrollee an index of delay equal
to the number of days graduation is delayed past her enrollment spell divided by the
number of days spent in active training. The variable DELAY is equal to the median
of that index over all enrollees in the training agency.25 This index for the 16 training
agencies ranges from 0 to .45. Agencies with an index of 0, for example, graduate at
least half their enrollees right after their training ends. We assume that earnings after
training are generated by the same equation as in (7) but now add the DELAY variable.
24Unfortunately, our data contain only persons who were enrolled during the experimental window,
which excludes a signi￿cant fraction of enrollees for most calendar days.
25We used median instead of mean because the median is less sensitive to outliers.
23Under the gaming hypothesis, we conjecture that the coeﬃcient on the DELAY variable
is negative.
T h ee s t i m a t e si nT a b l e4c o n ￿rm this hypothesis. Models II and III include on their
right hand sides the measure DELAY, ￿rst alone and then together with JUNE.I nb o t h
cases the coeﬃcient estimates are negative and signi￿cant. As in Model I, the coeﬃcient
estimate for JUNE in model III is negative and signi￿cant. One may argue that those
training agencies that delay graduation longer are more likely to operate in depressed labor
markets. This could generate a ￿nding that earning gains are lower for training agencies
that delay graduation. Models II and III therefore include labor market controls. Even
after controlling for labor market environments, we ￿nd that year-end timing activities and
graduation timing activities are negatively correlated with earning gains. This evidence
is consistent with the hypothesis that these activities are gaming strategies, because they
in￿ate agency performance while lowering organizational performance.
6 Summary
This paper studies timing responses to incentives. We ￿nd that JTPA training agencies
time the reporting of the trainee￿s performance outcomes to maximize their incentive
awards. We show that training agencies report good training outcomes promptly but
wait on bad ones in the hope that they improve. In those cases where bad outcomes are
unlikely to improve, training agencies report these outcomes only in good years where they
do not risk losing their awards. In bad years, they postpone reporting bad performances
until the next year to secure the minimum level of performance required to qualify for an
award.
We formally test for the impact of these timing responses on the eﬃciency of the
organization. We ￿nd that the timing responses in JTPA lower the eﬀectiveness of job
training, as measured by the impact of training on enrollee earnings. This eﬃciency test
suggests that this timing behavior is evidence that training agencies game the incentive
system. This evidence of gaming demonstrates that there are costs to using explicit
24performance incentives.
We conclude with a note on our perspective as to where our work ￿ts within the incen-
tive literature. This paper presents evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that
performance incentives in organizations lead to costly distortions in agent behavior. One
could argue, however, that the costs we identify are speci￿c to a poorly designed incentive
system, and that these costs could be easily reduced or even eliminated under alternative
designs. Whether these costs can easily be eliminated, however, is entirely an empirical
issue that cannot be addressed until one observes and studies the responses to these alter-
native designs. Only by studying the responses to alternative designs can we tackle the
fundamental issue of whether incentives are second-best eﬃcient. Unfortunately, our data
do not allow us to address this second-best question. Keeping this broader perspective in
mind, this paper constitutes the ￿rst step toward a more ambitious eﬃciency analysis of
the use of incentives in organizations.
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Decision Graduation of Model of Estimation Squares Least
parentheses) in statistics (t ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
( = variable Dependent g ˜− f˜) _______________________________________________________________________________________
Estimates Coefﬁcient A. _______________________________________________________________________________________
IV Model III Model II Model I Model Variable _______________________________________________________________________________________
[0.] (1− u 34.378 )
(10.876)
[1.] (1− u)× (t ˜ − s ˜ .975 .798 .986 )
(4.827) (10.061) (10.061)
[2.] u 101.771 101.771
(14.999) (14.999)
[3.] u× (1− j 89.904 113.133 )
(6.171) (13.837)
[4.] u× j 79.384
(6.629)
[5.] u× j× LOW 38.000
(3.001)
[6.] u× j× MED 117.211
(33.587
[7.] u× j× HIGH 24.791
(.575) _______________________________________________________________________________________
437 2327 2327 2327 Obs.
R2 .1363 .1534 .1503 .1579 _______________________________________________________________________________________
Variables: of Deﬁnition B. _______________________________________________________________________________________
g ˜ date graduation =
f˜ date end training =
e ˜ date end training following employment of day ﬁrst =
u otherwise 0 end, training following days 90 the during anytime employed not was enrollee if 1, =
j otherwise 0 June, or May April, of months in ends training enrollee’s if 1, =
LOW other- 0 standard, performance below is year-end before just performance agency training if 1, =
of deﬁnition precise for text (see wise LOW, MED and , HIGH)
MED stan- performance to close but above is year-end before just performance agency training if 1, =
otherwise 0 dard,
HIGH 0 standard, performance above well is year-end before just performance agency training if 1, =
otherwise
_______________________________________________________________________________________
(Continued)(Continued) 1 TABLE ______________________________________________________________________________________ _ ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
Tests Hypothesis C. †
______________________________________________________________________________________ _
H0 Prob>F
IV Model III Model II Model I Model ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
enrollee the not or whether same the is delay graduation of duration the enrollees, idle Among 1.
end. training following days ninety the during employment experiences
β 0=β 2 .0000 ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
graduated are training following days 90 the in employment experience eventually who enrollees Idle 2.
employment. of onset the at
β 1= .9000 II) as (same .8880 1 ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
on graduated are training following days 90 the in employment experience never who enrollees Idle 3.
end. training following day 90th the
β 2= .0829 90
β 3= .9947 .0047 90 ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
training when longer is delay graduation employment, experience never who enrollees idle Among 4.
year. program the of months 3 last the to compared as months 9 ﬁrst the in ends
β 3=β 4 .0200 ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
of months 3 last the in ends training whose employment, experience never who enrollees idle Among 5.
is year-end to prior just performance the whether same the is delay graduation of duration the year, the
(LOW than less much = 1 (HIGH than greater much ), = 1 standard the to close but than greater or ),
(MED= 1).
β 5=β 6 .0243
β 7=β 6 .0295
β 5=β 7 .7107 ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
Notes:
† β x no. variable on estimate coefﬁcient the is x where , x A. Panel in brackets in number the to corresponds
1. P obtain to two by Divide tests. two-tail for are values p test. one-tail for values
errors. standard robust on based statistics t 2.2 TABLE
Months Non-June and June in Graduated Clients JTPA Adult of Outcomes Performance
1987-1989 Centers, Training All ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
Test Wilcoxon
Prob June Non-June >  Z ______________________________________________________________________________________ _
Graduation at Rate Employment
1 .0001 0.450 0.648
(0.014) (0.006)
1190 5169
Follow-up at Rate Employment
2 .0001 0.449 0.534
(0.014) (0.007)
1190 5169
Earnings Weekly Follow-up Average
3 .0005 209.015 226.584
(5.255) (2.720)
509 2563
Graduation at Wage Average
4 .1892 5.669 5.780
(0.120) (0.061)
501 2578
Follow-up at Worked Weeks Average





errors. standard below are counts Observation parentheses. in mean the of errors Standard 1.
spells. enrollment experimental age) of years 22 (over adult from Calculated 2.
reported enrollee on based information employment graduation, at rate employment the except measures all For 3.
data. reported center training on based dates Graduation data.
distributions. of equivalence of test sum rank is test Wilcoxon 4.
1 center. job-training by reported as graduation at employed reported graduates JTPA of Fraction
2 graduation. of day the after weeks 13 on-going spell job one least at reporting (self) graduates JTPA of Fraction
3 graduation. after week thirteenth the in earnings market labor total Average
4 graduation. of week the in wage hourly Average
5 graduation. following weeks 13 the in recorded worked weeks of number Average3 TABLE
who Enrollees for Rule Graduation of Estimation
end training at employed Were (1)




Prob No Yes >χ 2
_______________________________________________________________________________________
.147 (36%) 35 (64%) 61 Yes in increase Wage
(50%) 18 (50%) 18 No spell secondary
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Test Sum Rank Wilcoxon
Distributions of Equivalence of
Prob >  Z
_______________________________________________________________________________________
secondary in wage between Difference
.002 .521 2.115 end training at wage and employment
($) Mean
_______________________________________________________________________________________
parentheses. in fractions row by followed are panel upper in counts Cell 1. Notes:
of month the during or before but ends, training month the after begins which spell a is spell Secondary 2.
delayed was graduation enrollee’s an spells, secondary multiple of case the In period. grace day 90 the of end the
occur. to spell secondary ﬁrst the of beginning the after occured it if4 TABLE
Timing Year-End and Graduation of Impact Efﬁciency
assignment training following months 18 in earnings total enrollee variable: Dependent ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Estimate Coef.
stat.) (t
III Model II Model I Model Variable _______________________________________________________________________________________
no no yes dummies Agency





1281 1281 1284 Obs.
R2 .21 .20 .22 _______________________________________________________________________________________
Notes:
living younger or 6 aged child a has enrollee the whether of indicator an sex; age; race; include regressions All 1.
and earnings assistance; general and stamps, food AFDC, of recipiency of indicators status; marital home; at
dura- (self-reported) and training; of type level; education training; to prior months 12 the in histories employment
training. of tion
ser- the of size employment relative the rate, wage average the of measures local include measures market Labor 2.
rate. unemployment the and sector, vice
June. in spent spell training (self-reported) the of fraction the as deﬁned is JUNE 3.
is graduation days of number the to equal is DELAY agency. training a at activities delay of index an is DELAY 4.
the in enrollee median the for measured training, of days of number the by divided training, of end the past delayed
agency. training the at sample experimental
errors. standard robust on based are statistics t 5. 
 
TABLE 1.A 
National JTPA Performance Measures in Effect in Years 1987-1989 
 
Performance Measure  Definition 
Employment Rate at Graduation  Fraction of graduates employed at graduation 
 
Welfare Employment Rate at Graduation  Fraction of graduates receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at 
graduation 
 
Average Wage at Graduation  Average wage at graduation for graduates who were employed at graduation 
 
Cost per Employment  Training center￿s year￿s expenditures on adults divided by the number of adults 
employed at graduation 
 
Employment Rate at Follow-up  Fraction of graduates who were employed at 13 weeks after graduation 
 
Welfare Employment Rate at Follow-up  Fraction of graduates receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at 13 
weeks after graduation 
 
Average Weekly Earnings at Follow-up  Average weekly wage of graduates who were employed 13 weeks after graduation 
 





1.  The date of graduation is the date the enrollee officially exits training.  A graduate is an enrollee after he has officially exited training. 
2.  All measures are calculated over the year￿s graduate population.  Therefore, the average follow-up weekly earnings for 1987 were calculated 
using earnings at follow-up for the graduates who graduated in 1987, even if their follow-up period extended into 1988.  Likewise, persons 
who graduated in 1986 were not included in the 1987 measure, even if their follow-up period extended into 1987. 
3.  A positive graduation is entering un-subsidized employment, attaining youth employment ￿competencies￿ (through course-work, training 
and/or tests in work maturity, basic education, or job-specific skills), entering non-JTPA training, returning to school full-time, or completing 
a major level of education. 